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Abstract
This paper discussed the role and authority of  Salahuddin Wahid, a prominent 
muslim scholar, who actively promotes the minority rights in modern-day 
Indonesia. His credentials as a traditional ulama coming from the tradition of  
a pesantren allow him to become an authority in Islamic matters. Salahuddin’s 
recognition as muslim scholar is in some ways observable from his responses 
to religious questions posed by the people, either directly or through social 
media. A general observation of  Salahuddin’s Twitter account will allows us 
to realize that he also represent an authority in “cyber-Islam”. He felt the 
growing importance of  social media, as well as the necessity to promote inclusive 
religiosity and the respect of  minority rights through social media, accordingly 
he actively promotes his ideas through social media most particularly Twitter. 
Some issues have been discussed to overview Salahuddin’s ideas to best promote 
minority rights.  His activism can be felt most notably in the following issues: 
ethnic minorities, women’s rights, religious minorities, diminishing the violence 
against the Ahmadiyya, and the marriage of  religious minorities.
[Paper ini membincangkan peran dan otoritas Salahuddin Wahid, seorang 
intelektual muslim terkemuka yang aktif  mempromosikan hak-hak 
kelompok minoritas di Indonesia. Karisma yang dimilikinya sebagai seorang 
ulama yang berasal dari kalangan pesantren tradisional memberinya sebuah 
otoritas dalam berbagai aspek ajaran Islam. Keulamaannya dalam batas 
tertentu dapat ditelusuri lewat respons yang diberikan atas pertanyaan 
masyarakat yang diajukan kepadanya, baik secara langsung maupun lewat 
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sosial media. Pengamatan umum terhadap akun Twitter Salahuddin Wahid 
sekaligus menunjukkan otoritasnya di dunia maya. Dia sadar betul pentingnya 
sosial media sebagaimana pentingnya mempromosikan keberagamaan inklusif  
dan penghormatan terhadap hak-hak kelompok minoritas. Karenanya, dia 
aktif  menyuarakan pendapatnya lewat sosial media, khususnya Twitter. 
Beberapa masalah didiskusikan dalam tulisan ini untuk melihat secara umum 
pemikiran Salahuddin Wahid terkait dengan hak-hak kelompok minoritas: 
minoritas etnis, minoritas agama, hak-hak perempuan, kekerasan terhadap 
Ahmadiyyah, dan pernikahan antar agama.]
Keywords: minority rights, ethnic minority, religious minority, cyber 
Islam.
A. Introduction
Since ancient time, minorities have been in weak position and 
become the natural targets of  genocide and persecution. In modern time, 
which is regarded a period of  relative tolerance and rationality, we also 
witness that minorities at times become the targets of  discrimination and 
repression.1 In the new-order Indonesia we encounter some government 
programmes which are aimed at civilizing and developing indigenous 
minorities throughout the country.2  We also come across many cases of  
discrimination towards Chinese minorities, especially during the New 
Order. In the present-day Indonesia, cases of  discrimination and violence 
towards religious minorities are still prevalent. 
We witness a number of  Indonesian scholars who play a strong 
role in defending minority rights, one of  them is Salahuddin Wahid. This 
present study is dealing with the role and authority of  this scholar-activist 
in promoting the minority rights in modern-day Indonesia. 
B. The Discourse on Minority Rights 
Minority is conceived by Francesco Capotorti as “a group 
numerically inferior to the rest of  the population of  a state, in a non-
dominant position, whose members --being nationals of  the state-- 
1 Javaid Rehman, The Weaknesses in the International Protection of  Minority Rights 
(Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p. 3.
2 Christopher R. Duncan, “From Development to Empowerment: Changing 
Indonesian Government Policies toward Indigenous Minorities”, in Civilizing the Margins: 
Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of  Minorities, ed. by Christopher R. 
Duncan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 86–115.
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possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those 
of  the rest of  the population and show, if  only implicitly, a sense of  
solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion 
or language”.3 Kymlicka outlines three distinctive stages of  the discourse 
on minority rights.4 The first phase of  the debate is situated within the 
context of  contestation between liberalism and communitarianism. 
Minority rights, in this sense, are perceived as a resistance of  communally-
minded minority groups against the intrusion of  liberal individualism. In 
this regards, one may see that the defence of  minority rights fall within 
the concern of  communitarianism. The second phase of  the discourse 
deals with possible scope for minority rights within the framework 
of  liberal theory. The liberal theorists discord about the appropriate 
role that the nationality, language, and ethnic identities might play 
within the framework of  democratic societies and institutions. Groups 
affirming minority rights (often labelled as “liberal culturalists”) argue 
that some forms of  recognition for the minorities’ practices, languages, 
and identities are not only in conformity to liberal principles but also 
necessitated by them.5
Kymlicka classifies the rights (that a minority group may assert) into 
two clusters: (a) “internal restrictions” and (b) “external protections”).6 
“Internal restrictions” are concerned with the rights that a particular 
group may exert against its own members, which aims at preventing the 
group from destabilisation. “External protections” deal with the rights 
that a group may exert against the broader society. The third stage of  the 
debate turns around the question how some minority rights claims are a 
reaction to, or connected to, nation-building policies. There are at least 
three varied strategies which the minorities may take in terms of  majority 
nation-building: (a) admitting the integration into the majority societal 
culture; (b) striving to establish their own societal culture and contesting 
to state nation-building; (c) accepting the enduring marginalisation.7
It is worth emphasizing that in the context of  Indonesia, minority 
rights mainly refer to common rights of  citizenship which are also 
3 “Minorities Under International Law”, United Nations Human Rights (2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Minorities/Pages/internationallaw.aspx, accessed 
21 Sep 2013.
4 Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship 
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accorded for minority rather than to special rights which are granted to 
the minority in recognising their practices and languages. Palguna rightly 
observe that in principle there are no particular constitutionally guaranteed 
rights that are bestowed to certain Indonesian people exclusively on the 
ground of  their religion, ethnicity, social status or region.8 
Palguna goes on to say that there is a certain portion of  recognition 
to the specific rights in Indonesian Constitution. These specific rights are 
exclusively granted to the so-called “customary legal entities” (Kesatuan 
Masyarakat Hukum Adat) and to specialized regional institutions (like the 
province of  Aceh, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta).9 It is worth mentioning that 
these customary legal entities refer to certain traditional communities 
within Indonesian societies, in which the provisions of  customary law 
(hukum adat) become one source of  law. The official explanation of  
the National Constitution however prescribes that these provisions of  
customary law are not to run contrary to the principles of  the Unitary 
State of  the Republic of  Indonesia. The implementation of  the provisions 
of  customary law is further regulated by regional bylaws issued by the 
Regional People’s Representative Council.
It seems to me that the “customary legal entities” share some 
features with, what Kymlicka labels as, “autochthonous minorities” 
but they do not necessarily represent the “autochthonous minorities”. 
Kymlicka distinguishes between “autochthonous minorities” (new 
minorities) and “non-autochthonous minorities” (traditionally settled 
minorities) for his discussion of  the basis of  minority protection. In 
some countries, it is only autochthonous minorities which are eligible 
to minority protection, in the sense of  possessing specific rights in 
developing their “societal culture”.10
Pertaining to the discussion of  religious minority, the notion of  
religion in the context of  Indonesia is worth particular remarking. In 1952 
the Ministry of  Religion, which was dominated by muslims, brought out 
a restricted definition of  religion: a religion should possess a holy book 
8 I. Dewa Gede Palguna, “Minority Rights in Indonesia: In Search of  Suitable 
Legal Remedy for Constitutional Complaint”, in State, Law and Religion in Pluralistic 
Societies Austrian and Indonesian Perspectives: Austrian-Indonesian Dialogue Symposium, ed. by 
Astrid Hafner, Sabine Kroissenbrunner, and Richard Potz (Vienna: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2010), p. 131. 
9 Ibid.
10 As cited by Julija Sardelić, “Constructing ‘New’ Minorities: An Evaluation of  
Approaches to Minority Protection in Post-Socialist Slovenia from the Perspective of  
Liberal Multiculturalism”, Journal for Ethnic Studies, no. 67 (2012), pp. 100–23.
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and a prophet. This sort of  definition rules out the “mystical movement” 
and “local indigenous religion” as legitimate religious expressions of  the 
Indonesian people.11
It is not easy to interpret the census of  Indonesia which indicates 
that Muslims comprise 88% of  the population, Christians 5%, Hindus 
2%, Buddhists 0,8%, and Confucianists 0,3%. This is due to the plurality 
within and outside these religions. Many people embrace these “stately 
recognised religions” simply because they wish to secure the protection 
from the government. They are nominally recorded as the followers of  
these religions, but in practice, they still maintain to some extent the rituals 
of  their respective local religions.12 When we look into that census, it is 
apparent that Muslims constitute the majority of  the population, but it 
does not necessarily mean that the minority religions are marginalized. We 
can observe this in the case of  Christians who exert a strong influence 
in the society, from colonial time until nowadays.13
C. Short Biography of  Salahuddin Wahid
Salahuddin Wahid was the vice chairman of  the national board of  
human rights (2002-2007). His standing as national figure can be observed 
for instance from the fact that he was named as one of  the candidates 
of  Indonesian vice-presidents in 2009. He is also recognised as one of  
outstanding scholars of  the country as can be seen from the fact that 
the Kompas daily newsletter listed him as one of  the “five dedicated 
scholars” of  the country.14 
Salahuddin has produced some books including Negeri Di Balik 
Kabut Sejarah: Catatan Catatan Pendek Salahuddin Wahid (The Country 
behind the Shadow of  History: Short Essays of  Salahuddin Wahid) 
(2000) and Mendengar Suara Rakyat: Catatan-catatan Pendek Salahudin Wahid 
(Listening to the People’s Voices: Short Essays of  Salahuddin Wahid) 
(2001). Salahuddin is concerned with a certain spectrum of  religious 
11 Niels Mulder, Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java: Cultural Persistence 
and Change (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1978), p. 22.
12 Marburg Franke and Katrin Gotterbarm, “Kritik durch Anpassung? Aluk 
to dolo und Christentum im Pancasila-Staat Indonesien”, in Religionsinterne Kritik und 
religiöser Pluralismus im gegenwärtigen Südostasien, ed. by Manfred Hutter (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2008), pp. 217–28.
13 Ibid., p. 217. 
14 Ana Shofiana Syatiri, “Kompas Anugerahi Lima Cendekiawan Berdedikasi 
2013”, Kompas.com (27 Jun 2013), http://sains.kompas.com/read/2013/06/27/1144192/
Kompas.Anugerahi.Lima, accessed 3 Sep 2013.
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pluralism, namely emphasizing tolerance and respect of  minority rights. 
Salahuddin’s commitment to eradicate intolerance can be perceived 
from his defence to the head of  Lenteng Agung village in Jakarta. The 
newly elected head of  the village was demonstrated by some of  her 
constituents who disagreed with the election due to the fact that her 
religious convictiowwin differs to that of  her constituents.15 Salahuddin 
plays a role in minimizing intolerance within the Nahdlatul Ulama 
(Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization), as can be observed from his 
recommendation to the kiais (Muslim scholars) of  Madura to reconcile 
without any prerequisite with the Shi’ite adherents at the region.16 
Besides, Salahuddin is concerned with the conflict-reconciliation, as 
can be observed from his involvement in reconciling the conflict between 
Muslims and Christians which broke out in 1999 in Ambon. His concern 
with conflict-reconciliation can be also perceived from his involvement 
in lessening the conflict between the supporters of  Abdurrahman Wahid 
(which comprise mainly from the members of  the Nahdlatul Ulama) and 
the supporters of  Amien Rais (which comprise mostly from the members 
of  the Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Islamic organization) 
regarding the special session of  the People’s consultative assembly, which 
was held in July 2001, which targeted the impeachment of  Abdurrahman 
Wahid from presidency.17
Salahuddin’s standing in the field of  education can be discerned 
from the title of  Doctor Honoris Causa which he obtained on 10 
December 2011 from State Islamic University (UIN) Maulana Malik 
Ibrahim, Malang, Indonesia. He was granted this award due to his 
academic achievement and his dedication to manage the activities of  
Islamic education, most notably in confirming and continuing the 
development in the Pesantren Tebuireng, Jombang, East Java.18 In his 
scientific oration entitled “Transformasi Pesantren Tebuireng: Menjaga 
15 Rina Atmasari, “Soal Lurah Susan, Ini Kata Gus Sholah”, Tempo.co (13 Jul 
2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/08/23/083506850/Soal-Lurah-Susan-
Ini-Kata-Gus-Sholah, accessed 9 Sep 2013.
16 Arief  Rizqi Hidayat, “Salahuddin Wahid Sesalkan Sikap Ulama Madura”, 
Tempo.co (24 Jul 2013), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/07/24/078499266/
Salahuddin-Wahid-Sesalkan-Sikap-Ulama-Madura, accessed 17 Sep 2013.
17 Salahuddin Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, Refleksi Pemikiran Menuju Indonesia 
Bermartabat (Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2011), pp. 119–55.
18 “Doctor HC Pertama di UIN Maliki”, The Center of  Excellence and Islamic 
Civilization (9 Oct 2011), http://uinsite.uin-malang.ac.id/blog/2011/12/doctor-hc-
pertama-di-uin-maliki, accessed 17 Sep 2013.
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Tradisi di Tengah Tantangan” (The Transformation of  Pesantren Tebuireng: 
Maintaining Tradition amidst Challenges), Salahuddin revealed the unique 
features of  pesantren as an educational institution. He points out that 
the pesantren is people’s sponsored educational institution which has 
enlightened the people in the Indonesian archipelago before the intrusion 
of  Dutch system of  education. Pesantren has contributed to the moulding 
of  Islamic spirit which is able to dialogue smoothly with the local culture 
as well as the dynamics of  civilization.19
His leadership at the Pesantren Tebuireng (2006-present) 
constitutes his new role, which is to some extent does not match his 
formal educational background; his elementary and intermediate formal 
education were not gained in Islamic schools. His bachelor degree 
was obtained from Bandung Institute of  Technology. He even once 
served as the associate director in one international property firm, from 
1995-1996. It is perhaps due to this formal educational background, 
Salahuddin admits that he is not a Muslim scholar who is able to teach 
Islamic knowledge, on the one hand.20 On the other hand, he realizes his 
wide reception among the pesantren stakeholders due to the fact that 
he was a descendant of  Hasyim Asy’ari and his own potentials, most 
particularly the capacity in communicating with different parties, which 
is of  significance in developing the pesantren.
Salahuddin labels himself  as the “engineer which strives to develop 
the pesantren”.21 His appointment as the leader of  the pesantren is 
accordingly considered breaking the mainstream. The former leader 
of  the Pesantren Tebuireng, Yusuf  Hasyim (1929-2007), expressed his 
consideration in the following words:
Considering the fact the Pesantren Tebuireng is an institution which has 
national reputation, its leader should be someone who has good reputation 
at the national level as well. There are two candidates who may replace 
my position: Abdurrahman Wahid and Salahuddin Wahid. From the side 
of  knowledge, Abdurrahman is obviously better; but from the side of  
health and availability, Salahuddin is better.  Herewith I decide Salahuddin 
to be the next leader of  the Pesantren Tebuireng.22 
At this point, we may observe Salahuddin’s varied roles ranging 
19 Ibid.
20 Salahuddin Wahid, Transformasi Pesantren Tebuireng: Menjaga Tradisi di Tengah 
Tantangan (Malang: UIN Maliki Press, 2011), pp. 127–28.
21 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, pp. 139–44.
22 Wahid, Transformasi Pesantren Tebuireng, pp. 125–6.
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from engineer, politician, human rights activists, the leader of  a pesantren, 
to a muslim scholar. Salahuddin’s recognition as a muslim scholar is to 
some extent detected from his responses in Twitter pertaining to the 
religious questions posed by the people.  
Roles are presumed by interactionism to be unceasingly remade 
in connection with relevant others; and this imposes the identification 
of  the grounds on which roles are differentiated. Differentiation in this 
sense refers to two aspects: (a) sorting and secerning diverse actions and 
sentiments, and incorporating them into distinct roles; (b) accumulating 
and adding behaviors to specific roles.23 We may analyze Salahuddin’s 
role in the light of  this theoretical framework. We may view Salahuddin’s 
role differentiation in two ways: (a) there have been processes of  
sorting diverse actions and sentiments; in accordance with subjects’ 
and holder’s aspirations, demands and desires; and incorporating them 
into Salahuddin’s “new distinct role”; (b) there have been processes of  
adding behaviors and tasks to Salahuddin’s specific role. It is assumed, 
that Salahuddin’s previous specific role is one of  these roles: “Muslim 
scholar”,  “human rights activist”, “politician” or “engineer”.
D. Salahuddin Wahid and His Authority Credentials
Salahuddin Wahid learned in the pesantren of  his father, the 
Pesantren Tebu Ireng. The training in this traditionally acknowledged 
institution renders him qualification as a muslim scholar. Despite the fact 
that Salahuddin obtained his bachelors’ degree from secular university, 
he has been recognized as a muslim scholar, and consequently appointed 
as the leader of  the Pesantren Tebu Ireng.
Salahuddin is noticeable from the greater part of  his audience 
by the fact that he is thoroughly proficient in classical Arabic. This 
proficiency facilitates him in understanding the major texts of  Islam, 
including the Quran, hadith, Islamic law, and Islamic mysticism. The 
proficiency in classical Arabic and subsequent mastering of  classical 
Islamic texts thus constitute important credentials of  Salahuddin’s 
authority. In his sermons, Salahuddin often quotes Quranic verses 
and Prophetic sayings. Such quotations are of  significant to provide 
legitimacy of  his discourses. 
Salahuddin possesses an authority as faqih, a traditionally trained 
23 Ralph H. Turner, “Role Theory”, in Handbook of  Sociological Theory, ed. by 
Jonathan H. Turner (New York: University of  California, 2006), p. 236.
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muslim legal scholar. His legal reasoning is acknowledged by many 
Indonesian scholars. A kiai or muslim scholar must at least master 
the rulings of  fiqh, and he will be consulted by people pertaining to 
fiqh problems in the society. Salahuddin’s standing as faqih can be 
observed for instance from people’s consultation to him pertaining 
to matters of  Islamic law, either directly or via social media.
Humphreys belongs to scholars that are convinced that Islamic 
law constitutes a significant part of  muslim society. 24 Further, he 
argues that Islamic law is a significant source for social and economic 
life. Digests of  positive law suggest that fiqh and sharia were not only 
rooted in social ideals but also in social reality. Among the Malikite, 
adaptation to the social realities took the form of  ‘amal, a concept 
which allowed a qāḍī or mufti to regard established local custom and 
necessity in framing his rulings. As the positive content of  sharia was 
increasingly defined by authoritative compilations, commentaries, and 
digests, the fatwa became the most important tool for addressing 
contested issues. From the 6th/12th century, it became common for 
eminent faqihs or their disciples to collect and publish their fatwas. 
The extant legal documents can be divided into three broad classes, 
Sharia-court records, deeds of  waqf, and contracts on subjects of  all 
kinds.
Salahuddin’s success is to some extent to the rareness of  
traditionally trained religious authorities who are familiar with 
contemporary issues and modern social media. Salahuddin is able to 
communicate contemporary issues by using simple language so that 
it can reach the majority of  the muslim community in Indonesia. 
The community’s recognition to the authority of  religious leader is 
observable from the support they provide to him; such as providing 
him leave of  absence from taking part in communal labour obligations 
and supporting his travel expenditures.25 The similar can be said about 
kiai in Indonesia, including Salahuddin. They enjoy support from the 
community. The community usually give him leave of  absence from 
communal labour responsibility even they will voluntarily do some works 
24 R. Stephen Humphreys, Islamic History: A Framework for Inquiry (New York: 
Princeton University Press, 1991). 
25 G. Lyons, “From Advanced Towards Effective Traveller Information Systems”, 
in Travel Behaviour Research: The Leading Edge, ed. by David A. Hensher (Pergamon Press, 
2001), pp. 813–26, http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/8550/1/8550.pdf, accessed 1 Jun 2014.
280 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014 M/1435 H
Asfa Widiyanto
for him, such as erecting and maintaining his pesantren. They also provide 
financial support to the kiai and his pesantren. The kiai usually belongs 
to those responsible for receiving and distributing the zaka (almsgiving), 
accordingly he serves as one of  economic axis in muslim community. 
Salahuddin’s credential of  authority is one thing, and the people’s 
acknowledgement of  Salahuddin’s authority serves to accentuate his 
possession of  authority. The recognition of  Salahuddin’s authority can 
be also detected from the number of  people who are attracted to attend 
Salahuddin’s religious gatherings (pengajian), and from the personages who 
regularly invite Salahuddin to deliver a talk to their forums. In Youtube 
we witness many videos of  Salahuddin’s preaching, which were attended 
by many people. 
Salahuddin is regarded as an authority among Muslims in Indonesia, 
in the sense that he acts as a mufti (jurist consult), whom people ask 
guidance regarding their religious problems. People’s eagerness to consult 
Salahuddin on religious matters can be perceived as their recognition of  
Salahuddin’s authority. People’s recognition of  Salahuddin’s authority 
can also be seen from people’s appreciation to Salahuddin’s opinions 
in Youtube. This can be observed for instance in Youtube video entitled 
“Tanggapan Gus Solah atas Sosok Jokowi” (Salahuddin’s response to 
the figure of  Joko Widodo).26 This video was viewed 32.193 times, 
attracted 276 likes, 6 dislikes, and 25 commentaries. This video was 
uploaded two months before Indonesian presidential election on 9 July 
2014. Many people were interesting in watching this video since they are 
curious to know Salahuddin’s political preference and vision regarding 
presidential election. It is worth remarking that Salahuddin is considered 
an influential figure in the circle of  Nahdlatul Ulama, accordingly his 
political preference most likely become the reference among this circle.
Salahuddin’s authority is in some ways inherited from his father 
Wahid Hasyim (1914-1953) a well-known religious scholar who led the 
Pesantren Tebu Ireng, Jombang, East Java. Wahid Hasyim served as the 
first minister of  religion under Soekarno’s regime. He held this position 
in 1945, and from 1949 to 1959 Salahuddin is believed to inherit some of  
his father’s charisma.27 The son of  a kiai in Indonesia is normally called 
26 “Tanggapan Gus Sholah Terhadap Sosok Jokowi”, Youtobe.com (4 May 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugSXgLCx_ys&feature=youtube_gdata_player, 
accessed 17 Sep 2014. 
27 Charisma is at times defined as a certain quality by which a person is treated 
as if  they have superhuman or at least extra-ordinary qualities; Parrinder Geoffrey, 
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“Gus” (literally means “handsome”), so “Gus” is the noble title for the 
santri community. A well-known saying circulated in the santri community 
reads “the son of  lion should become a lion, not a cat”. This indicates 
that the leader’s charisma can be effectively and fully transferred to his 
son.28 Accordingly many kiais are anxious if  they do not have sons whom 
they could transfer their charisma and whom they trust in continuing their 
leadership. A son is deemed to be the best sort of  successor for his father. 
Cases in which the son of  a kiai is not willing, for instance, to take over 
to the position of  his father are regarded as a sign of  the fading charisma 
of  the family, all the more so if  there is no one to succeed the kiai.
In Max Weber’s view, total trust in the leader is among the signs of  
charisma.29 What is apparent in the charisma is that this, from sociological 
point of  view, is in some ways marked by recognition from a group of  
people. In Javanese society in general, one possessing charisma is believed 
to have better chances of  filling an important position in society. Such a 
person normally possesses a strong “inner-feeling” (rasa) resulting from 
practicing mystical disciplines. The idea of  “inner-feeling” itself, as one 
publication indicates,30 underlies the possibility of  personal experience and 
feeling as the ultimate touchstones for the truth. This mode of  thought 
is based on the acknowledgment that there is always something implicit 
and non-rational within most phenomena and experiences.
We can see that the phenomenon of  employing mystical practices 
for the sake of  yielding potency and efficacy is not uncommon in Javanese 
society. The existence of  charisma as a legitimacy for leadership is present 
in most societies. However, the source of  this charisma may differ from 
one society to another. Salahuddin’s credentials of  authority are in some 
ways distinct to those of  Muslim televangelists, in the sense that these 
televangelists mostly did not undertake a classical training in Islamic 
“Peace”, in The Encyclopedia of  Religion, ed. by Mircea Eliade and Charles J. Adams (New 
York: Macmillan, 1987). One publication indicates that charisma is much more a quality 
attributed to a person by the people, particularly his followers, rather than his real quality. 
In other words, the attribution of  charisma is mostly grounded on the conviction 
of  the people, rather than that the person concerned possesses power or any other 
extraordinary quality; Richard C. Anderson, “How to Construct Achievement Tests to 
Assess Comprehension”, Review of  Educational Research, vol. 42, no. 2 (1972), pp. 145–70.
28 The transfer of  charisma is designated, in the vocabulary of  Max Weber, as 
“routinisation”; Reinhard Bendix, “Reflections on Charismatic Leadership”, Asian 
Survey, vol. 7, no. 6 (1967), pp. 341–52.
29 Ibid.
30 Mulder, Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java.
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scholarship (either from the Pesantren or from any respectable Islamic 
education institutions in the Middle East). Their authority rests mostly 
in their ability to relate Islamic doctrines with contemporary issues. 
The closeness of  identity between the televangelists and their 
audience also plays an important role in establishing the authority of  
these televangelists. Many of  these televangelists identify themselves 
as ordinary human beings who are susceptible to commit sings, and 
accordingly address their audience in simple and humanist way. Some of  
these televangelists clearly admitted that they committed some big sins 
in the past, but after that the repent and asked God’s forgiveness. The 
media, most notably the television, plays likewise an undeniable role in 
moulding the authority of  these televangelists. 
One may say that their authority is more susceptible to break down, 
if  we compare this with that of  the kiais, especially due to their unsound 
basis of  authority. The relation between these televangelists and their 
audience takes in the form of  “celebrity-fans” rather than “religious 
leader-followers”. One may observe for instance the breakdown of  this 
credibility in the case of  Abdullah Gymnastiar. Gymnastiar lost most of  
his credibility as he conducted polygamy. It is worth remarking that many 
of  his followers are females and they were attracted to listen Gymnastiar’s 
preaching mostly due to the fact that he showed his great care to his wife 
in public which clearly indicated that he was a caring and ideal husband.
In this regards, Friedman’s, lassification of  “being an authority” is 
worth mentioning. Friedman categorizes “being an authority” into two 
sub-clusters:  (a) “authority over beliefs”, (b) “authority over conduct”.31 
For Friedman, religious scholars, experts and parents are instances of  
those possessing “authority over beliefs”; whilst judges, generals and 
legislators possess “authority over conduct”. When we employ Friedman’s 
categorization it becomes clear that the authority of  such a religious 
scholar as Salahuddin falls into the sub-cluster “authority over beliefs”.
Pertaining to the discourse on kiai, whether it represents a cultural 
broker, as advocated by Clifford Geertz, or a genuine entrepreneur of  
social change, as proposed by by Hiroko Horikoshi, I would rather stick 
to the latter standpoint. For Hirokoshi, as cited by Abdurrahman Wahid,32 
the kiai plays an active role in selecting positive values and behaviors which 
31 Renee F. Friedman and Douglas J. Brewer, Fish and Fishing in Ancient Egypt 
(Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1990), p. 57.
32 Pradjarta Dirdjosanjoto, Memelihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren, Kiai Langgar di Jawa 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), p. xv.
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are to be developed in society, and accordingly sketches his own priority 
scales and initiatives in response to social change. It seems to me that 
this role is particularly relevant in cyber era nowadays. Despite the fact 
of  overwhelming sources of  information available on the internet, the 
kiai remains an authority pertaining to matters Islamic, most specifically 
the kiais who energetically employ Web 2.0 in disseminating their ideas. 
The kiai represent as moral and spiritual authority which inspire the 
people in social change.
The kiai, according to Horikoshi, is able to explain the complex 
theological problems to the farmers or laymen in accordance with their 
respective logic and or conscience.33 As a charismatic figure, a kiai is 
usually independent in making decision, and in his interaction with other 
elements of  the society.
1. Salahuddin Wahid, Religious Authority and Social Media
Salahuddin’s standing as an authoritative figure can be also 
investigated with the help of  social media, most notably Twitter and 
Facebook. In this regard, I will pay considerable attention to Salahuddin’s 
presence in Twitter due to the fact that Twitter represents public oriented 
social media. Salahuddin’s presence in Facebook can be perceived from 
the “fan page” dedicated to him. The fan page entitled “Salahuddin 
Wahid” succeeded in attracting 476 people to click the “like” bottom, 
as of  November 4, 2014. Salahuddin’s presence in Twitter is much more 
pervasive, since he possesses a Twitter account entitled @Gus_Sholah. 
This Twitter account attracted more than 259.000 followers, as of  
November 4, 2014. Salahuddin’s activeness in Twitter can be seen from 
the number of  his tweets which reach 32.000 as of  November 4, 2014.
Twitter refers to “a popular micro-blogging and social network 
service that allows people to share messages” not exceeding 140 
characters in length.34 Twitter represents an aspect of  virtual reality. 
Some people are convinced that this realm of  reality does not necessarily 
correspond to factual reality in the society. It must be admitted, however 
that the discourses in Twitter in some ways influence the policy and 
33 Hiroko Horikoshi, Kyai dan Perubahan Sosial: Kyai and Social Change, trans. by Umar 
Basalim and Andi Muarly Sunrawa (Jakarta: Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren 
dan Masyarakat, 1987), p. 1.
34 Lee M. Humphreys, Balachander Krishnamurthy, and Phillipa Gill, “How 
Much Is Too Much? Privacy Issues on Twitter”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of  
the International Communication Association (Suntec City, Singapore, 21 Jun 2010), http://
www2.research.att.com/~bala/papers/ica10.pdf, accessed 28 May 2014.
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events in the society. 
Twitter can be perceived as both form of  communication and social 
organization. When we look into traditional Islamic scholarship, we begin 
to realise that the notion of  “followers” in Twitter is comparable to the 
term mustami‘ūn (listeners, audience). When we turn specifically to the 
followers of  Salahuddin’s Twitter account, we can also ascertain that some 
of  these mustami‘ūn may fall into the category of  muqallidūn (followers, 
adherents to Salahuddin’s major ideas). Mustami‘ūn is a general term 
designated to those subscribed to read Salahuddin’s ideas. Muqallidūn  is 
more specific in the sense that these persons do not only read Salahuddin’s 
ideas, but also regard him as an authority, and accordingly consult him 
pertaining to some religious problems. Some of  these “muqallidun” are 
treated by Salahuddin as “elite followers” (khawwās) whom he follows 
and whose Tweets are sometimes retweeted. If  we draw an analogy 
with traditional Islamic scholarship, “retweeting” is comparable to iqrār 
(confirming, approving). This group of  muqallidūn sometimes consults 
Salahuddin pertaining to religious problems.
The second variant of  Salahuddin’s mustami‘ūn is the so-called 
“fellows”. This group of  people serve as people with whom Salahuddin 
interact in more egalitarian mode. They are followed by Salahuddin. They 
do not consult Salahuddin, but rather discuss with him pertaining to 
some issues. The third variant of  Salahuddin’s mustami‘ūn is the so-called 
“critics”. This group of  people subscribes to view Salahuddin’s ideas, 
but do not agree with him in some issues, and criticize him accordingly.
The quantity of  “followers” weight on Twitter, at least due to 
two factors: (a) the high number of  followers enhances the possibility 
of  the spreading the messages; (b) users with high number of  followers 
are considered more prestigious than those have limited number of  
followers. These two benefits make some people eager to increase the 
number of  their followers, by interacting with people, following other 
users, and posting a fascinating information. Some people pursue another 
strategy in gaining more followers, they strive to manipulate the number 
of  followers, by creating different Twitter accounts or by employing 
third party application that enable the users to obtain many followers. It 
seems that Twitter contributes to the establishing of  narcissistic culture.
It is difficult to quantify the followers of  a cleric, a saint or a 
prophet in pre-modern times. The situation is currently changing; with 
the emergence of  Twitter the number of  followers of  the figures who 
register as Twitter users is quantifiable. When we look into Salahuddin’s 
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Twitter account, we begin to realize that he also represents as an authority 
in “cyber-Islam”. He felt the growing importance of  social media, as 
well as the necessity to promote inclusive religiosity and the respect of  
minority rights through social media; accordingly he actively promotes 
his ideas through social media most particularly Twitter. Salahuddin 
enthusiastically posts his tweets pertaining to religion, politics, law and 
other issues. It is worth remarking that almost every day he post his tweets. 
He has been consulted on many issues on matters Islamic covering: 
fiqh, morality, Sufism and theology. On fiqh related matters, Salahuddin 
has been consulted pertaining to such problems as ethics of  replying 
greetings, prayer (most particularly the prayers of  hajat, tahajjud, istikhara).
People’s consultation to Salahuddin pertaining to fiqh is worth 
remarking. One Twitter user asked a question whether the optional dawn 
prayer (salat sunnat al-fajr) should be performed after or before adhan. In 
response to that, Salahuddin said, “I myself  perform it after adhan”.35 
Another Twitter user posed a question regarding Quranic stipulation 
on tattoo. Salahuddin replies the question by saying diplomatically, “in 
my own opinion, tattoo is forbidden”.36 It seems to me that Salahuddin’s 
response is due to his awareness of  the criticism of  some conservative 
Muslims towards one Indonesian minister who has tattoo in her bodies. 
Salahuddin strives to avoid judging this minister since he is conscious 
that not all prescriptions of  Islamic law are implemented in Indonesia, 
since Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Accordingly, when one Twitter 
user asked, “What about the minister’s tattoo?” Salahuddin replied by 
saying, “that is her personal business”.37 Modern fiqh issues such as 
blood donation are also consulted to Salahuddin. One Twitter user 
posed a question regarding Islamic law’s standpoint on blood donation. 
Salahuddin responded to the question, by saying that, “If  the donor is 
35 Salahuddin Wahid, “Saya sholat setelah Adzan @Randy_Hendra: @
Gus_Sholah Sholat sunnat fajar itu sebelum adzan subuh atau antara adzan-Iqmah dan 
beda dengan sunnat Qobliyah?”, Twitter.com (00 - 29 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/
Gus_Sholah/statuses/527354232001671168, accessed 6 Nov 2014.
36 Salahuddin Wahid, “Menurut saya tidak boleh. @sspamungkas: @Gus_
Sholah @pramono_ar @kurdiabujundi @bobihendra hukum tato Gus? menurut 
syariat Islam.”, Twitter.com (28 - 29 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
statuses/527300973262163968, accessed 14 Dec 2014.
37 Salahuddin Wahid, “Jangan merokok di tempat umum. @bobihendra: 
Kiay @Gus_Sholah , Bagaimana pendapat Kyai mengenai Mentri yang merokok 
dan bertato?”, Twitter.com (32 - 29 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
statuses/527256640127389696, accessed 4 Nov 2014.
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healthy, he will reap rewards from God”.38
Salahuddin has done his best to enlighten the people the relative 
binding of  a fatwa. This can discerned for instance from Salahuddin’s 
reply to one Twitter user, who said, “The Majelis Ulama Indonesia 
issued a fatwa on the prohibition [of  smoking], did not it?” In response 
to that, Salahuddin stressed that the fatwa is not binding.39 This Twitter 
user continued his question by saying, “Is the fatwa on halal and haram 
not applied to all people?” Salahuddin replied the question by stressing 
that such a fatwa is only applied to those who believe it.40
Salahuddin is also concerned with some people who strive to 
enforce all prescriptions of  Islamic law in Indonesia without realizing 
that Indonesia is not an Islamic state. This can observed for instance in 
Salahuddin’s reply to the question posed by one Twitter user. This Twitter 
user raised a question, “rajm (stoning) and qisas (equal retaliation) are not 
found in the national constitution, but are available in the Quran. So rajm 
and qisas are not applied in our country? Great! The national constitution 
defeats the Quran”. In response to that, Salahuddin asserts that both rajm 
and qisas are not implemented in Indonesia.41 Salahuddin’s enlightenment 
is also observed in his reply to the remark of  another Twitter user, namely, 
“The chairman of  Anshor (Youth branch of  the Nahdlatul Ulama) said, 
‘national constitution is higher than religious law’.  In response to that, 
Salahuddin stresses that religious law is implemented in Indonesia if  it 
has been incorporated in the national constitution.42
38 Salahuddin Wahid, “Kalo sehat, berpahala. @ode_ahmad: menurut pandangan 
ISLAM  #DonorDarah itu Halal pa Haram pak @Gus_Sholah?”, Twitter.com (26 - 30 
Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/statuses/527768395953864704, accessed 
22 Dec 2014.
39 Salahuddin Wahid, “Fatwa itu tidak mengikat. @navikindi: Bukankah MUI 
sudah menfatwakan kharam Gus? @Gus_Sholah @bobihendra”, Twitter.com (59 - 29 
Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/statuses/527263324442877952, accessed 
2 Aug 2014.
40 Salahuddin Wahid, “Berlaku hanya bagi yang percaya. @Condare: Apa 
fatwa tentang halal haram itu tidak berlaku atas  semua orang? Aneh @navikindi 
@bobihendra”, Twitter.com (06 - 29 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
statuses/527295365783891969, accessed 2 Jun 2014.
41 Salahuddin Wahid, “Tidak berlaku di RI. @aim_revolt: @fimadani Rajam 
dan Qishash gak ada di UU tapi ada di Qur’an. Gak berlaku berarti? Hebat. UU 
ngalahin Al-Qur’an”, Twitter.com (30 - 15 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
statuses/522227956358205440, accessed 2 Dec 2014.
42 Salahuddin Wahid, “Hukum Agama berlaku bila Ada di dlm UU. @ 
you_bram: Pripun niki?  -@fimadani: Ketua GP Ansor: Di Atas Hukum Agama Ada 
Konstitusi Negara”, Twitter.com (27 - 15 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
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Salahuddin has done his best to underline the necessity of  
enlightening the people pertaining to tolerance and respect towards non-
Muslim minorities. This can be seen for instance from the question posed 
by one Twitter user, namely, “Does Islam teach us to hate other religions?” 
Salahuddin replies the question by asserting that Islam does not teach 
so. Questions on khilafah  also appear on Salahuddin’s timelines. One of  
these questions read as, “some Indonesian people are aspiring towards 
khilafah. What is your opinion of  the necessity of  khilafah?” Salahuddin 
answered the query by saying, “for me, it is not necessary”.43 Another 
question reads as, “What is your opinion on khilafah?” Salahuddin replied, 
“Indonesian constitution does not recognise such system”.44
When we read Salahuddin’s postings in his timelines, we begin to 
realize an aspect of  his agency. It seems to me that Salahuddin is aware of  
varied trajectories of  action pertaining to the necessity of  enacting Islamic 
state: (a) the support of  Islamic state as, for them, Islam is concerned 
with both religion and state (al-islām dīn wa dawla); (b) the support of  
enforcing a big portion of  Islamic law provisions in the country and the 
strive to establish Islamic society;  (c) the support of  plural Indonesian 
state by incorporating  a limited portion of  Islamic law in the national legal 
rulings; (d) the support plural and secular Indonesia without necessarily 
incorporating provisions of  Islamic law in the national legal rulings, 
since they pay more attention to the spirit of  Islam in contributing to the 
betterment of  society rather than formalizing it in the legal regulations in 
the country. It seems to me that Salahuddin sticks to the third trajectory.
The supporters enactment of  Islamic law in Indonesia are most 
notably Indonesian Party of  Islamic Liberation (HTI), The Mujahidin 
Council of  Indonesia (MMI), and Defenders Islamic Front (FPI).45 For 
Wahid, the MMI’s strategies in enacting Islamic law are worth remarking 
since they has taken some tangible actions regarding the enforcement 
statuses/522212087397769216, accessed 2 Dec 2014.
43 Salahuddin Wahid, “Menurut Saya tidak perlu. @pepesiwak: Yai @
Gus_Sholah beberapa umat Islam di Indonesia menginginkan berdirinya Khilafah, 
masihkah perlu yai?””, Twitter.com (9 Nov 2014), https://twitter.com/Gus_Sholah/
statuses/528369309114830850, accessed 9 Jun 2014.
44 Salahuddin Wahid, “Hukum RI, Tidak mengenal itu. @lutfisarif: 
Assalamu’alaikum @Gus_Sholah, bagaimana menurut njenengan hukum Al Khilafah 
atau Al Imamah Al ’Ushma?”, Twitter.com (13 - 30 Okt 2014), https://twitter.com/
Gus_Sholah/statuses/527750022335442944, accessed 2 Dec 2014.
45 Salahuddin Wahid, “Belajar dari Pemimpin Masa Lalu”, SuperKoran.info (12 Mar 
2007), pp. 80–1, http://superkoran.info/?p=1465, accessed 3 Dec 2007.
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of  Islamic law most particularly by giving suggestion to amend some 
chapters of   the national constitution so as to conform with Islamic 
law. Such tangible actions are not undertaken by other organizations 
including the FPI.
Salahuddin highlights the differing strategies in struggling for the 
implementation of  Islamic law. From 1945 to 1959, The Nahdlatul Ulama 
once struggled for making Islam as the foundation of  the state. In the 
following period, the Nahdlatul Ulama strived to include the “Jakarta 
charter” in the national constitution. Nowadays, the Nahdlatul Ulama 
attempts to incorporate “particular” provisions of  Islamic law in the 
corpus of  national legal system, most particularly via the production of  
Acts. This is distinct to PBB and MMI who struggle for enforcing Islamic 
law via the State Constitution.  Another difference lies in the fact that 
the MMI and PBB struggle for the implementation of  Islamic law as a 
whole, whilst the Nahdlatul Ulama does not include the ritual aspects of  
Islam (‘ibāda maḥḍa) as the focus of  its struggle.46 Salahuddin bases his 
argument that the Nahdlatul Ulama also struggle for the implementation 
of  Islamic law on statute of  this organization. He specifically refers to the 
chapter five of  this statute which reads, “the goal of  the Nahdlatul Ulama 
is to implement the teachings of  Islam, according to the Ahl al-Sunna 
wa al-Jama’a, in the society in the Republic of  Indonesia”. Salahuddin 
interpret the phrase “teachings of  Islam” as covering Islamic law.47 
Ali rightly observes that the collapse of  President Soeharto in 1998 
brought an implication of  more intensive contestation between moderate 
and conservative Islamic groups.48 This contestation is to be understood 
as religious-political contestation rather than mere religious contestation. 
Both groups strive to exert an influence on the silent majority part of  
Indonesian Muslim community.
The fall of  Soeharto has also an implication to the changing role of  
the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of  Muslim Scholars). 
During the national congress which was held in 2000, the MUI declared 
the change of  its role, from being “the servant of  the government” to 
“the servant of  the Muslim community”. This role shifting also has an 
46 Salahuddin Wahid, “Realitas ‘NU’ tidak Sesederhana yang Kita Bayangkan”, in 
NU Politik: Analisis Wacana Media, ed. by Fathurin Zen (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2003), p. xiv.
47 Ibid. 
48 Muhamad Ali, “Moderate Islam Movement in Contemporary Indonesia”, 
in Islamic Thought and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia, ed. by Rizal Sukma and Clara 
Joewono (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), p. 202.
289Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014 M/1435 H
Salahuddin Wahid and the Defence of  Minority Rights
impact on MUI’s products such as fatwas and tausiyyas which seem to be 
in conformity with conservative aspirations.49
2. Salahuddin Wahid and Ethnic Minorities
Salahuddin also shows his concern with the violence against ethnic 
minorities in Indonesia. This can be perceived from his attention and 
solution to the case of  violence against Chinese minority which occurred 
in May 1998 preceding the fall of  the President Suharto (reign 1966-
1998).  He predicts that the Chinese minority will be victims against if  the 
country is in chaos. This is due to the envy of  “poor majority” towards 
Chinese minority (which constitutes the “market-dominant minority”).50 
In the eyes of  Salahuddin, in order to solve that problem the 
government should issue economic policies which take side which the 
people, most notably in urban areas whose residents are potential to 
involve in the chaos. The approach of  many city mayors in dealing with 
traditional traders by displacing them for the sake of  pleasing big capital 
owners (which mostly Chinese) is like putting a big amount of  fireable 
materials. Salahuddin goes on to give an example in which city mayor 
has been able to take side with people. Joko Widodo (the former mayor 
of  Surakarta, Central Java) performed the dialogue fifty times with the 
traders in Surakarta to search a viable solution in revitalizing the traditional 
market.51 Salahuddin’s suggestion to empower the majority of  the have-
nots is worth remarking, since it will gradually eliminate the discrepancy 
between the minority of  the haves and the majority of  the have-nots. 
The envy of  this majority is considered potential to elicit tension (and 
consequently violence) to the minority. Economic factors are believed 
to be the main trigger of  this intolerance, rather than some other factors 
as political and cultural factors. 
This does not necessarily negate any political factors in triggering 
the violence; such as the existence of  intolerant groups which seeks to 
get a certain political advantage from the occurrence of  violence. Palguna 
rightly points out that in such a democratic society, like Indonesia, 
coercions to individual freedom no longer principally come from the 
49 Moch Nur Ichwan, “Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia and the Politics of  Religious Orthodoxy”, in Contemporary Developments in 
Indonesian Islam: Explaining the ‘Conservative Turn, ed. by Martin Van Bruinessen (Singapore: 
Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), pp. 60–1.
50 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 107.
51 Ibid., p. 108. 
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state (and its apparatus) but rather from a certain intolerant segments 
within the society. 52
3. Salahuddin Wahid and Women’s Rights
Salahuddin pays a certain attention to women’s rights. This can be 
observed for instance from a question posed by one Twitter user, namely, 
“An unregistered marriage (nikah siri), which is performed by many kiais 
in Indonesia, falls within the category of  individual right. Why does the 
state intervene to this matter?” Replying to this question, Salahuddin 
asserts that, “it is the responsibility of  the state to protect the women”.
Salahuddin’s concern with women’s rights can be also detected 
from the following excerpt, in which he underlines the negative effects 
of  polygyny and unregistered marriage to women:
The state is to respect the opinion of  minority of  Indonesian Muslims 
who allow such a marriage by providing a chance to register their 
marriage to the Office of  Civil Registration, so that their marriage is 
considered legitimate in the eye of  the state. If  the state explicitly forbids 
such a marriage, it would mean that the couple violate the state law and 
accordingly are susceptible to sanction. The same condition would be 
applied if  the Act forbids poligyny, the couple who perform this kind of  
marriage would be sanctioned. How it is if  this polygny is not registered 
(sirri)? Can an unregistered marriage be considered as violation to the 
state law and accordingly is liable to sanction? Is an unregistered marriage 
considered as void an accordingly is not subject to any sanction. If  [the 
latter] becomes the case, the second wife and her children would undergo 
discriminative action because there is probability that they would not 
obtain the same rights as the first wife and her descendants. The first 
wife and her descendants would be also aggrieved, but the husband could 
not be penalized.53
In the eyes of  Salahuddin, the enactment which sets 30 percent 
quota for women in the parliament as of  February 2003 is of  the best 
achievement of  women’s movement. This quota allocation can be deemed 
as an affirmative action towards the women which had been marginalized. 
This affirmative action has rendered a new bargaining to the polemics on 
the validity of  female president which was prevalent during the general 
election in 1999. At that time, many Muslim personages held the opinion 
that a female president is not allowed in Islamic law. The enactment of  
52 Palguna, “Minority Rights in Indonesia”, p. 131.
53 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 245. 
291Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014 M/1435 H
Salahuddin Wahid and the Defence of  Minority Rights
quota for women in the parliament has forced many parties, including 
Muslim personages, in reconsidering the issue of  female president more 
comprehensively.54
At this point, Salahuddin sees the interplays between the 
prescriptions of  Islamic law and constitutional law. What is also worth 
stressing is the existence of  varied standpoints within the Muslim scholars 
pertaining to the possibility of  female ruler. The root of  dispute is a 
differing interpretation regarding a prophetic saying that people who hand 
over their affairs to a woman will not succeed. Many muslim scholars 
interpret this hadith and are accordingly convinced that entrusting a 
woman as state ruler is illegitimate. Some other scholars perceive this 
hadith from another angle, namely from its historical context: at the 
moment a woman does not have any capacity of  ruling a certain country 
she would not allowed to serve as state ruler, but if  another moment 
(of  history) shows that a certain woman possesses a leadership capacity, 
appointing her as state ruler would be not a problem.
These latter scholars base their arguments on the specific historical 
context in which this hadith was issued. It is reported that the Prophet 
issued this hadith in response to one Persian Caesar who assigned his 
daughter as his successor. The Prophet heard information that this 
female successor did not have adequate leadership capacity.55 At this point 
we may see that these latter scholars stick to the principle of  Islamic 
jurisprudence: al-‘ibra bi-khusūs al-sabab la bi-‘umūm al-lafẓ (the general rule 
usually observed is that one goes by the specific meaning suggested by 
the specificity of  the case rather than simply the general sense of  such 
words). 
Salahuddin is aware that granting women’s rights through 
political breakthrough is not supported by the cultural structure which 
is compatible with gender equality, and this needs a process, with the 
passage of  time. He highlights another obstacle in implementing this 
quota allocation, namely whether this policy will be followed by the 
increasing capacity of  women in public life. In the logic of  managing 
modern public life, capacity is the only requirement which applies for 
both men and women. Marginalization of  women which happens since 
54 Ibid., pp. 402–3. 
55 Mohammad Monib and Islah Bahraw, Islam dan Hak Asasi Manusia dalam 
Pandangan Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2011), p. 257.
292 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2014 M/1435 H
Asfa Widiyanto
long time ago automatically decreases the competency of  women.56
4. Salahuddin Wahid and Religious Minorities
One Twitter account posed a question to Salahuddin whether 
Salahuddin would support if  the minister of  religion hails from the 
circle of  the Shi’a. Salahuddin responded to this enquiry by stating 
that the minister of  religion should not come from political party and 
should not create a problem (May 3, 2014). Salahuddin went to say that 
the appointment of  minister of  religion from the Shi’a would trigger 
a problem since there would be many protests from those not Shi’ite. 
The same case would happen if  the minister of  religion were appointed 
from the Ahmadiyya (May 4, 2014). It seems to me that this question 
was posed in respond the current rumour that a Shi’ite leader may be 
appointed as the minister of  religion if   Joko Widodo were elected as 
the president. In this regard, we may discern that Salahuddin is against 
the idea of  appointing minister of  religion from a minority Muslim 
group, since it is potential to trigger some problems which would hinder 
inner- and inter-religious harmony in the country. This appointment is 
susceptible of  protests from many religious groups, most particularly 
the majority. Salahuddin’s statement implies that the minister of  religion 
should hail from the majority Muslim group, with a certain characteristics: 
(a) respecting the rights of  minority and promoting harmony; (b) being 
not fond of  creating problems; (c) being not affiliated with a certain 
political party. Salahuddin’s hesitance to appoint the candidate of  
minister of  religion who hails from a political party is seemingly due to 
his concern with the phenomenon of  politicization of  religion. Some 
politicians are suspected to make use of  religion for political purpose, 
most particularly by employing anti-minority sentiments to attract votes 
from the conservative groups. 
Elsewhere, Salahuddin some other criteria for electing somebody 
as the minister of  religion, by saying: “Acceptability is one of  the factors 
to assess who is the right person for such a political position as a minister 
of  religion. The figure is to understand the position of  religion in the 
context of  nation-state. In addition, he/she is to comprehend the State 
Constitution. He/she is likewise to be able to communicate with many 
parties.57 
56 Salahuddin Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas: Refleksi Pemikiran Menuju Indonesia 
Bermartabat (Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2011), p. 402.
57 Ibid., p. 315.
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Salahuddin’s specific concern with human rights is also apparent 
from his conversation with Joko Widodo. Salahuddin’s Twitter account 
listed some of  his recommendations pertaining to the future of  Indonesia. 
First, the necessity of  law enforcement and fulfilment of  human rights 
(which include economic, social and cultural rights). Second, bureaucratic 
reform. Third, the establishment of  ministry of  taxation. Fourth, economic 
sovereignty (May 3, 2014). 
During Indonesian general election in 2014, minority issues 
have been used by many personages to attract supports from some 
religious mass-organizations.  The support of  the United Development 
Party’s chairman towards anti-Shi’a movement in Indonesia can be 
deemed to be a strategy to attract sympathy from some Muslim mass-
organizations, most particularly the radicals. We also notice that there 
have been tendency to politicize the anti-Shi’a sentiment in Indonesia. 
On 21April 2014, for instance, the representatives of  twelve Muslim 
mass-organizations gathered in Bandung, West Java, and formed the 
so-called “The National Alliance of  Anti-Shi’a”. One of  the initiator of  
this alliance, Ahmad Cholil Ridwan, argued that the people should not 
give their vote to Joko Widodo because if  Joko Widodo were elected 
as a president he would appoint Jalaluddin Rahmat (Indonesian Shi’ite 
leader) as the minister of  religion.58
The moderate Muslims and secular nationalists show their distinct 
position towards minority and freedom of  religion. They are also sensitive 
to the issues of  minority rights and religious freedom. An instance of  
this is a criticism made by some scholars and activists pertaining to the 
manifesto of  Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), of  which 
one of  its articles seems to hinder the religious freedom in the country, 
and consequently suppress the rights of  minority religious groups. The 
article of  this manifesto reads as follows, “The government/state is to 
regulate the freedom of  citizens in performing their respective religions 
or beliefs. The states are also required to ensure the purity of  the religions, 
which has been recognized by the state, from all forms of  defamation 
and misuse”.59 
58 “Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah Khawatirkan Jokowi Jadi Presiden”, Satuislam.
org (22 Apr 2014), http://www.satuislam.org/nasional/aliansi-nasional-anti-syiah-
khawatirkan-jokowi-jadi-presiden/, accessed 29 Apr 2014.
59 One of  media reports pertaining to this is “Peneliti LIPI: Kaum Minoritas 
Terancam Jika Prabowo Presiden”, Tribunnews.com (25 Apr 2014), http://www.
tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/04/25/peneliti-lipi-kaum-minoritas-terancam-
jika-prabowo-presiden, accessed 4 May 2014.
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Ronald M. Hartwell, as cited by Ebeling, conceives politicization 
as  “pervasive tendency for making all questions political questions, all 
issues political issues, all values political values, and all decisions political 
decisions....” Ebeling goes on to stress that “politicization thus takes the 
manifest form of  increasing the power of  the state, of  increasing political 
power as against all other forms of  power in society, of  increasing the 
power of  the politicians and the bureaucrats as against the power of  
individuals, private institutions, and voluntary associations....”.60 Erdogan, 
construes politicization as the utilizing of  an issue by politicians for the 
sake of  taking full advantage of  their votes.61 It is worth remarking that 
the word “politics” itself  can be understood in specific sense (namely: 
something to do with political party) and in generic and extensive sense 
(namely: the power of  influencing policy-making).62
The present-day Indonesia witnesses the politicization of  Shi’ism, 
most particularly prior to and during the general election and presidential 
election. Some political parties exploit anti-Shi’ite sentiments within the 
Sunni-majority Muslim country as Indonesia, to maximize their votes 
from the majority of  the population. They accuse their rivals as taking 
side with Shi’ite ideas and personages, and subsequently discourage the 
people from giving votes to these rivals. This politicization of  Shi’ism is 
considered strategic in attracting sympathy and votes from the majority of  
the population, since Shi’ism has been stigmatized by the Sunni-majority 
as deviant sect.
The party rivals, which assign some Shi’ite personages as legislature 
candidates, can be also considered as politicizing the Shi’ism. These parties 
bring forward such ideas as Islamic moderatism (wasatiyya), reconciliation 
of  Islamic schools, pluralism and tolerance, to support and legitimize 
their acknowledgment of  Shi’ism in the country. Such a strategy is not 
significant in winning more votes and sympathies, but will constitute an 
important contribution for the consolidation of  democracy in the country. 
60 Werner Ebeling, Victor Yu. Podlipchuk, and Alexander A. Valuev, “Molecular 
Dynamics Simulation of  The Activation of  Soft Molecules Solved in Condensed 
Media”, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 217, no. 1–2 (1995), p. v.
61 Turan Erdogan, “Fiber Grating Spectra”, Journal of  Lightwave Technology, vol. 
15, no. 8 (1997), p. 22.
62 Ibid., p. 9.
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5. Salahuddin Wahid and Dialogue Initiative in Minimizing the Violence 
Against the Ahmadiyya
To eliminate the cases of  violence against minorities, most 
particularly the Ahmadiyya, Salahuddin brings forward two apparent 
strategies: (a) anti-violence campaign; (b) dialogue.63 Salahuddin 
recommends the campaigns to prevent violence against suspected 
religious sect. This campaign is to be performed by the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Islamic organizations, and state authorities, especially in 
conflict-prone areas like Manis  Lor (Kuningan, West Java) and Pancor 
(Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara).64
It is worth mentioning that the presence of  Ahmadiyya in 
Indonesian archipelago has been felt since 1920s. The Lahore branch of  
the Ahmadiyya in the country established the “Indonesian Ahmadiyya 
Movement” (Gerakan Ahmadiyya Indonesia, GAI), whilst the Qadiani 
branch organized themselves into the “Indonesian Ahmadiyya 
Congregation” (Jamaah Ahmadiyya Indonesia, JAI). These two factions 
have successfully attracted more than 300,000 followers across the 
country. The Ahmadiyya constitutes a religious minority in Indonesia, 
and accordingly it has to deal with the boundaries of  religious freedom 
which it could exercise in Sunni-majority Indonesia.65
In line with this, Salahuddin felt the necessity of  educating people 
regarding the difference implication of  Islamic law and state law. Such 
awareness is considered significant in minimizing the violence against 
religious minorities. This can be observed from the subsequent quotation: 
Another thing that should be explained to the public is the fact that 
Indonesia is not an Islamic state. What apply in our country are Indonesia’s 
national laws. The provisions of  Islamic law are only applied in Indonesia 
if  they have been absorbed into our national law. It should be explained 
that if  somebody violates a certain injunction of  Islamic law but does 
not break the state law, [he/she cannot be penalized]. Thus, somebody 
else who penalizes this person is considered as someone who breaks the 
law.  It is worth explaining, that those entitled and obliged to take action 
against violators of  state law is law enforcers, not anyone. Muslim leaders 
should give such an explanation to their followers.66
63 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 300. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Melissa Crouch, Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications, 
SSRN Scholarly Paper, no. ID 1551645 (New York: Social Science Research Network, 
2010), pp. 4–5.
66 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, pp. 306–07.
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At this point we may become aware of  the projective facet of  
Salahuddin’s agency. We may suppose that Salahuddin’s strategy in 
addressing radicalism and intolerance within Muslim community, not 
within other faith communities, is not without grounds and is related to 
the future possible trajectories of  his action. Firstly, Salahuddin is a Muslim 
scholar, and he felt that one of  his social roles is to counsel and nurture 
the Muslim community; the efforts to advise the radical groups within 
other faith communities lie predominantly within the responsibilities of  
the scholars of  these respective faith communities. Secondly, Salahuddin is 
yearning that the Muslim community, most notably in Indonesia, could set 
as an exemplary tolerant Muslim community so as to reduce the negative 
images of  Islam as epistomized in western media. 
Salahuddin suggests the performance of  dialogue which involves 
all related parties: Ministry of  Religious Affairs, Attorney General, 
Indonesian National Police, National Commission of  Human Rights, 
the Constitutional Court, People’s Representative Council, Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia, Ahmadiyya, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, other Islamic 
organizations, leading universities, and experts. Salahuddin goes on to 
assert that the dialogue should be conducted with an open heart and mind, 
not to be a priori, there should be no intimidation. If  such a dialogue 
cannot answer the problem of  Ahmadiyya, it means that the nation fails 
to answer one of  its fundamental problems.67
During the dialogue, it can be discussed whether the Ahmadiyya 
adherents have the right to live in Indonesia, by referring to Islamic law, 
National Constitution, and human rights principles.68 At this juncture, we 
may perceive that Salahuddin regards that Islamic law alone cannot serve 
as a basis of  prohibiting the Ahmadiyya in the country, since Indonesia 
is not an Islamic state. Salahuddin goes on to explain about the dialogue:
Such a dialogue is apparently not able to solve all the problems in 
one time. All arguments should be stated frankly. Is it true that the 
Ahmadiyya possesses a scripture which is distinct from the Koran? 
Is it true that the creed of  Ahmadiyya differs to that of  [orthodox] 
Muslims? All necessary evidences should be brought in their original 
forms. If  we cannot solve well this sensitive problem, what would 
be the Indonesian people?.69
67 Ibid., p. 315.
68 Ibid., p. 300.
69 Ibid., p. 319.
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Salahuddin is conscious that the theological arguments should be 
also brought forward in the dialogue:
I heard there is something new in the arguments of  Ahmadiyya. It says 
that the meaning of  “the prophethood of  Mirza Ghulam Ahmad” is in 
the sense that it is a form of  revival of  Prophet Isa (would this insult 
Christians?) and also as imam mahdi. Dawam Rahardjo and Abdul Muzawir 
(the chairman of  Ahmadiyya Youth) said that the Tadhkira of  Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad is not a scripture but rather a record of  Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad’s sayings. All these arguments should be discussed properly at 
that dialogue.70
Salahuddin is aware of  the limited reception of  his idea to perform 
dialogue:
Many people would not agree with the suggestion of  performing 
dialogue. The parties who commit violence certainly would not 
agree. The Majelis Ulama Indonesia probably would not consider 
that such a dialogue is important. They argue that Ahmadiyya 
acknowledge Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet, and this runs 
in counter to the Islamic faith, accordingly Ahmadiyya is false 
and misleading. That is it, no need for any dialogue. On the other 
hand, Ahmadiyya and their supporters who ground their viewpoint 
on the principles of  human rights would say that the right to live 
in Indonesia is guaranteed by the State Constitution. No need to 
have any kind of  dialogue. Full stop. If  the elites of  both parties 
have a certain a priori attitude, it would not surprise if  the fanatical 
followers at the grass root would be also a priori. These people at 
the grass root only imitate what their elites do. If  the elites of  both 
parties are reluctant to participate in dialogue, and conversely attack 
each other in the media, would it be logical if  we wish the changing 
of  attitude at the grass root level?.71
It is interesting to examine whether Salahuddin’s roles in eliminating 
radical tendency and violence within the Muslim community are in line 
with the established patterns within the Nahdlatul Ulama. At this point, I 
allude to Emirbayer’s and Mische’s three constitutive features of  agency: 
iterational, projective and practical-evaluative.72 The iterational dimension 
70 Ibid., p. 323.
71 Ibid.
72 Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische, “What Is Agency?”, American Journal of  
Sociology, vol. 103, no. 4 (1998), p. 971. 
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of  Salahuddin’s agency is observable in the condition in which Salahuddin 
reactivate parts of  the Nahdlatul Ulama’s patterns of  thought and action 
pertaining to moderate religiosity, most particularly as embodied in the 
principle of  “moderate and balance”. Salahuddin’s activism within the 
National Commission of  Human Rights has also played a role in shaping 
his attitude towards violence in the name of  religion.
The practical-evaluative element of  Salahuddin’s agency can be 
perceived from the condition in which Salahuddin makes practical and 
normative judgements among alternative possible trajectories of  action, 
including the increasing plurality within the Nahdlatul Ulama leadership 
(ranging from “liberal” to “conservative-literal” ); the involvement of  the 
members of  the  Nahdlatul Ulama in some political parties with their 
respective ideologies; the existence of  the members who stick to the 
international covenants of   human rights and neglect the prescriptions 
of  Islam; as well as the incoming of  transnational Muslim actors which 
alter the religious field in contemporary Indonesia. When I look to 
Salahuddin’s ideas pertaining to dialogue initiative to solve the problem 
of  Ahmadiyya, I begin to realize that Salahuddin felt the necessity of  
synergizing the paradigms of  human rights covenants with those of  
Islamic law to achieve a viable solution pertaining to Ahmadiyya. Such 
a convergence is for Salahuddin importance since Indonesia is neither 
secular nor theocratic state.
The projective aspect of  Salahuddin’s agency can be observed in the 
condition in which Salahuddin reconfigures possible future trajectories 
of  action in conformity with his hopes, fears, and desires for the future. 
Salahuddin is aware of  the increasing conservativism within the Muslim 
community as well as the increasing aspiration and activism to challenge 
the pluralism of  the country, in particular, and to endanger the world 
peace, in general. Salahuddin’s concerns with the sustainability of  the 
multicultural Indonesia have driven him to undertake some necessary 
actions to promote moderate religiosity through various media including 
his writing, his position at the Pesantren Tebuireng and his networking 
with some human rights activists.
6. Salahuddin Wahid and the Marriage of  Religious Minorities
Salahuddin employs the paradigm of  “the Pancasila state which is 
based on belief  in one God” in perceiving the regulation on marriage, in 
particular, and the legal matter, in general. This means that the People’s 
Representative Council may not produce a positive law that runs contrary 
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to the principles of  Islamic law which are agreed by the majority of  
Muslims in Indonesia. This also means the people may not forbid the 
opinion minority Indonesian Muslims.73 This shows Salahuddin’s respect 
to the opinion of  minority Indonesian Muslims, and accordingly he is 
conscious and appreciative towards inner-Islamic plurality.
Regarding the issue of  inter-faith marriage, Salahuddin says, “As a 
person, I would stick to the opinion of  majority of  Muslims that a muslim 
woman cannot marry to a non-muslim man. Nevertheless I would not 
agree if  the state law explicitly permit or forbid such a marriage. This 
is the domain of  Islamic law, and there is a dissent within the muslim 
community pertaining to that matter, and according the state is not to 
intervene with this”.74
Salahuddin goes on to argue:
Just let the condition as it is now, in which the Act Number 1/1974 
on marriage regulates that a marriage is valid if  it is performed in 
accordance with the provisions of  people’s respective religions. 
According to the majority of  Indonesian Muslims, the marriage 
between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man is not legitimate. 
It is clear that the state is not to intervene this by permitting such a 
marriage, which means that this would run contrary to the viewpoint 
of  majority of  Indonesian muslims.75
Salahuddin’s specific concern with the opinion of  minority of  
Indonesian Muslims is observable in the following excerpts: “The state 
is to respect the opinion of  minority of  Indonesian Muslims who allow 
such a marriage by providing a chance to register their marriage to the 
Office of  Civil Registration, so that their marriage is considered legitimate 
in the eye of  the state. If  the state explicitly forbids such a marriage, 
it would mean that the couple violate the state law and accordingly are 
susceptible to sanction”.76
At this juncture, we may see that Salahuddin’s viewpoint pertaining 
to marriage stands between two extreme pools. On the one hand, we 
encounter the standpoints of  such a scholar as Adian Husaini77 who 
wishes to incorporate all provisions of  Islamic law in positive law. On 
the other hand, we come across such a scholar as Abdurrahman Wahid 
73 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 244. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., pp. 244–45. 
76 Ibid., p. 245. 
77 Adian Husaini, “Pernikahan Lintas Agama”, Republika (15 Apr 2005). 
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to formulate a secular marriage Act.   
In the eyes of  Adian Husaini, all authoritative Muslim scholars are 
agreed that the marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim 
man is forbidden according to the prescription of  Islamic law. Husaini 
denied the existence of  a small number of  Muslim scholars who allow 
such a marriage. He as if  doubts the credibility of  the small number 
of  Muslim scholars as  can be observed from this quotation: “Of  
course, “Muslim scholars” (ulama) who are mentioned here are the real 
Muslim scholars, who have the capacity to perform ijtihad (independent 
reasoning) in deciding a legal status of  a certain issue based on valid 
methodology”.78
In addition, Husaini criticizes those who consent to the marriage 
between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man by basing their 
arguments on gender equality: “If  the logic of  secular human rights, 
religious pluralism and gender equality are employed to justify the validity 
of  the marriage of  a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man, then this 
logic will drag them to the vicious circle of  liberalism, as occurs in the 
case of  homosexuals in Western countries nowadays79
Salahuddin considers such figures as Abdurahman Wahid, Ulil 
Abshar Abdalla and Dawam Rahardjo to be the personages which tend 
to aspire for a secular state. It is worth mentioning that Salahuddin 
understands secular state, most particularly in the context of  Indonesia, as 
a state that does not give any chance for the inclusion of  “particularistic” 
provisions of  Islamic law, but does not negate its “universal” provisions.80 
Salahuddin disagrees with Abdurrahman Wahid pertaining to 
marriage Act and its excess on Confucianism (one of  the minority religions 
in Indonesia).81 It is worth mentioning that in 1998, Abdurrahman once 
became a witness in the regency court of  Surabaya, East Java, pertaining 
the session on the adherents of  Confucianism who are not allowed to 
registry their marriage in the Office of  Civil Service, since Confucianism 
at that time was unrecognized religion. These adherents were forced to 
profess themselves as Buddhists in order their marriage to be registered.82
Salahuddin points out that there were efforts from the secular-
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 246. 
81 Salahuddin Wahid, “Negara Demokrasi Tidak Mesti Negara Sekuler”, PCINU 
MESIR (2014), http://pcinu-mesir.tripod.com/ilmiah/pusaka/ispustaka/buku09/005.
htm, accessed 28 Mar 2014. 
82 Wahid, Berguru pada Realitas, p. 414.
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nationalist group who strived to establish a secular state by proposing 
draft bills on marriage which do not conform to Islamic law. The fraction 
of  “United Development” within the People’s Representative Council was 
against this idea, and was eventually successful in including the elements 
of  Islamic law in this Act. And this, according to Salahuddin, signified the 
beginning of  “Pancasila state” which is based on “belief  in one God”.83
Due to the protest of  “United Development” fraction and 
many Muslim mass-organizations, the People’s Representative Council 
eventually formulated the Article 1 of  the Act which “determines that 
the marriage is legitimate if  it is done in accordance with the laws of  
one’s respective religion”. Salahuddin points out that this Act is the first 
Act that provides a space for the inclusion of  the particular provisions 
of  Islamic law.84
Salahuddin also realizes the excess of  this Act on the adherents 
of  Confucianism, whose religious rights and marital status were violated 
by this Act. In addition, he appreciates Abdurrahman who defended 
the adherents of  Confucianism. Nevertheless, he is of  the opinion that 
with this excess, it does not necessarily mean that we should abolish this 
marriage Act, which has been in conformity with Islamic law.85 According 
to Salahuddin, this marriage Act protects the Muslim community who 
wish to marry according to the injunctions of  Islamic law and, at the same 
time, in conformity to marriage Act laid down by People’s Representative 
Council.86
In the eyes of  Salahuddin, the difference between the “Pancasila 
state” which is based on “belief  in one God” and the state which is 
based on “Jakarta charter”, lies on the fact that the former necessitates 
a limited version of  legalization of  Islamic law.87 It is worth noticing that 
the “Jakarta charter” was issued on June 22, 2014 and pointed five pillars 
of  the coming Indonesia, of  which the first pillar read as “the divinity, 
with the obligation of  performing the injunctions of  Islamic law for the 
adherents of  this religion”.
83 Wahid, “Negara Demokrasi”.
84 Salahuddin Wahid, “Menimbang Partai Islam”, Kompas.com (15 Apr 2014), 
http://indonesiasatu.kompas.com/read/2014/04/15/1105340/menimbang.partai.
islam, accessed 29 Apr 2014. 
85 Wahid, “Negara Demokrasi”. 
86 Din Wahid, Anatomi Gerakan Salafi di Indonesia (PKM II Kampus I STAIN 
Salatiga, 28 May 2014). 
87 Ibid. 
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E. Concluding Remarks
Salahuddin Wahid assumes varied role ranging from engineer, 
politician, human rights activist and Muslim scholar. He possesses some 
credentials which allow him to become an authority in Islamic matters. 
Salahuddin’s recognition as muslim scholar is in some ways observable 
from his responses to religious questions posed by the people, either 
directly or through social media. Any general observation of  Salahuddin’s 
Twitter account, will allows us to realize that he also represent an authority 
in “cyber-Islam”. He felt the growing importance of  social media, as 
well as the necessity to promote inclusive religiosity and the respect of  
minority rights through social media; accordingly he actively promotes 
his ideas through social media most particularly Twitter.
Salahuddin has done his best to promote minority rights.  His 
activism can be felt most notably in the following issues: ethnic minorities, 
women’s rights, religious minorities, diminishing the violence against the 
Ahmadiyya, and the marriage of  religious minorities.
This paper strives to show that minority rights can be effortlessly 
promoted within the framework of  “traditionalist” ideas when the actors 
possess the credibility among the majority of  citizens. Accordingly, 
traditionalist Muslim scholar such as Salahuddin may play a strong role 
in advocating the virtues of  minority rights in the Indonesian society 
in general, and among Indonesian Sunni-Muslim majority, in particular.
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